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    If the discipline of history could be persuaded to lie on the analysand's couch, what 
psychic structure would be revealed? Could Sigmund Freud's theories be useful in uncovering 
the unconscious of historiography? 'Ihomas Mann, it would seem, thought they could. In 
1937, Mann delivered a talk to the New School for Social Research which suggested, perhaps 
unwittingly, that nature is the unconscious of history. Mann's concern is entirely on the side 
of history's Ego, which is in a "pathetic, well-nigh alarming [situation]. It is an alert, promi-
nent, and enlightened little part of the Id-much as Europe is a small and lively province of 
the greater Asia. The Ego is that part of the Id which became modified by contact with the 
outer world; equipped for the reception and preservation of stimuli."' 'Mis European Ego 
faces weighty responsibilities. "It is the Ego's task," Mann declares, "to represent the world to 
the Id-for its good! For without regard for the superior power of the outer world the Id, in 
its blind striving towards the satisfaction of its instincts, would not escape destruction. The 
Ego takes cognizance of the outer world, it is mindful, it honorable tries to distinguish the ob-
jectively real from whatever is an accretion from its inward sources of stimulation."' On the 
other hand, the vast primal mass of Asia and the Unconsciousness Id, Mann tells us, "knows 
no time, no temporal flow nor any effect of time upon its psychic process." Asia therefore is 
without time and thus without modernitys history. This neat dichotomy, which pits History, 
Ego, Consciousness, and the West against Nature, Id, the Unconscious, and the East, is in 
Manr~s words, "a very perspicuous biological picture indeed." And it is also the structure that 
Japan faced as it tried to develop its own modern history. What follows is an analysis, some-
what in Mann's terms, of history's development, its suppression of nature, and the response 
of Japanese authors to that fundamental structure.
    History, as an academic discipline, was born in the early nineteenth century as one 
among many of modernitys new technologies. Germany led the way in professionalization, 
the first chair of history being founded at the University of Berlin in 18 10. France followed 
suit in 1812, and England belatedly joined the trend with Oxford's Regis Professorship of 
History in 1866, although English undergraduates were not allowed to read for a degree in 
historical studies until 1875 .3 History's purpose, as with most other technologies of moder-
nity, was to use rational processes to produce transcendent meaning. Philological methods, 
carefully catalogued archives, and professional training were enhanced and developed as the 
foundations of the new discipline, but the pursuit of history was invigorated by an impulse 
that in most cases went well beyond cautious, textually-based scholarship. 'Ihis impulse sought 
to enhance the prospects of modern society by tracing the lineaments of its ascendancy and 
discovering universal laws governing future progress. What gave past events meaning accord-
ing to this philosophical history was not so much their substantiation through documenta-
tion, but their relationship to the larger narrative of transformation, transformation toward
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freedom as never before experienced by human beings. History in the service of modernity 
relished Marx's idea that "everything solid melts into air," because it was hoped or, in some 
cases, simply assumed that the air into which solidity melted would be the breath of true lib-
erty. New forms of culture and technology, new forms of politics, new forms of selfhood and 
self-determination would form a new, free, world community. It was history's job to outline 
the course of this freedom. 
    The crucialquestion to be asked of modern freedom was freedom from what? 7be usual 
answer, for leftists and for liberals, was freedom from oppressive forms of tradition, govern-
ment, and economics-feudal aristocracies, absolute monarchs, plutocrats, or the bourgeoi-
sie-and certainly nineteenth-century philosophers of history did desire freedom from these 
things. However, I would suggest that this usual answer names only the second-order fears 
of those who sought the freedom of high modernity. When we return to nineteenth-century 
texts, it is not modes of government or economic production that provoke the primary terror, 
but something even more elemental and fundamental: nature itself, materialism at its most 
material. Nature is treated, over and over again, as a problematic limit on freedom; therefore, 
as with other modern technologies, history tries to master it, and yet, nature proves so intrac-
table, that history ends up, instead, merely suppressing it. 
    We see this pattern in Hegel and in Marx, in Walter Bagehot and John Stuart Mill, 
in Fukuzawa Yukichi and Kata Hiroyuki and elsewhere. These authors touch, sometimes 
only fleetingly, on the problem of nature, and then reflexively turn away to deal with more 
tractable difficulties like feudalism or the bourgeois state. While confidently disposing of the 
problems created by artifice, these authors conveniently forget about nature and the ways it 
determines our lives and, because they can forget about nature, they can predict an infinite 
future for human liberty. Nature looms at portals of modern history, only to be actively ex-
pelled from consciousness as soon as possible. 
    Yet, as we know from psychoanalysis, to repress something only gives it greater, unfore-
seen powers that shape conscious perceptions and actions without our necessarily acknowl-
edging it. In Freudian terms, to try to relegate nature to the dark, unspoken side of history 
created an Id for the history's Ego. Nature, I would suggest, became the repressed "other" 
of modern liberty in nineteenth and early twentieth century historical thought. Even in the 
late twentieth century, when historical narratives were critiqued as naive and teleological, 
the desire to repress nature, to forget its power, continued. The linguistic turn, for instance, 
simply changed the grounds on which nature-now just another human construct-could 
be dismissed even from postmodern history. In short, history develops as a means to control 
and dominate nature (as do other modern technologies), but, because its goal is human free-
dom, it soon forgets this original point of departure and relegates nature to the recesses of the 
historiographic unconscious. 
    This pattern is readily apparent in the founding works of the nineteenth century. In 
Yhe Philosophy of History, Hegel tells us that "the history of mankind does not begin with 
a conscious aim of any kind. . . . The History of the World begins with its general aim-
the realization of the Idea of Spirit-only in an implicit form (an sich) that is, as Nature; a 
hidden, most profoundly hidden, unconscious instinct; and the whole process of History 
... is directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one." In this passage, the
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whole of History mediates between conscious Spirit and unconscious Nature. NWhat is nature 
for Hegel? One might assume that nature represents forms of necessity that interfere with free 
will, but this is not the case. Freedom has all the force of necessity on its side since, in Hegel's 
optimistic scheme, the "destiny of the world" is freedom.' indeed, freedom is itself a necessity. 
Nature is lumpen and inarticulate, all that freedom is not, a mere cipher waiting to become 
word, will, and consciousness. On the individual level, this means that we are not both mind 
and body, but, in so far as we are free, we are independent of matter; we are Consciousness 
and thus Freedom disembodied. 
    But this is not all we should recognize in the Hegelian structure of history. Although 
Hegel is sublimely confident in the goodness of the world, he tells us that not all human 
beings recognize freedom as the necessary condition of being human. Indeed, the world is 
deeply divided. "The Orientals," he writes, "have not attained the knowledge that Spirit-
Man as such-is free; and because they do not know this, they are not free."' In the East, 
nature, unconsciousness, and unfreedom still reign. Perhaps permanently. Only in Europe do 
consciousness, and freedom abide. Since, as Hegel declares, "The History of the world is none 
other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedorn,117only Europe has history. The East 
is, in some fundamental and terrible way, nature. 
    Marx and Engels, turning this Hegelian idealism on its head, might be assumed to 
embrace nature seriously and treat it not as the antithesis of freedom but its matrix. And 
indeed, they appear at times to want to do just that, only to slip back into a purely human 
history, this time a dialectic driven not by Hegelian Spirit but by modes of production. In 
7he German Ideology, Marx and Engels begin by saying that the first premise of history is 
cc the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physi-
cal organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature." A 
beginning firmly rooted in the material, one might think, but then they shift abruptly away, 
saying, "Of course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of man, or into 
the natural conditions in which man finds himself. . . ."' Man's actual physical nature and his 
natural conditions, I would argue, pose a dangerous conceptual challenge to Marx and En-
gels because of the kind of freedom they desire. Although they would like to discuss nature, 
they cannot do so; indeed, they are afraid to do so. Why? The reason, I think, is that like 
Hegelian freedom, Marxist freedom sublimates nature entirely, overcoming it totally when 
communism triumphs. Marx and Engels ultimately suggest that the only oppressive forces 
with which we have to contend are artificially created by human beings. Nature which they 
had initially recognized'as "the first fact" of human life is brushed aside, appearing to offer 
no impediment or limit to human reinvention, so that once human oppression is revealed, 
the freedom achieved will be as absolute as Hegel's. Like Hegel, too, Marx and Engel suggest 
that the Orient, still in the thrall of Asiatic modes of production, is less free and more natural 
than European communities. 
    As we see here, in both the Hegelian and Marxist dialectic, modernitys aim was to 
overcome nature entirely in the quest for freedom. Ultimately, this overcoming is so com-
plete that nature is seen as a mere projection of human society by many twentieth-century 
scholars. George Lukaics, in the 1920s, insisted that "nature is a societal category." Later, 
Roland Barthes picked up the theme, telling us that in the modern era "nature has changed,
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has become social: everything that is given to man is already human, down to the forest and 
river which we cross when we travel."'O Some scholars have treated this form of dialectical 
overcoming as the only form of modernity, as does Maruyama Masao when he defines mo-
derniry in terms of the triumph of sakui or invention over shizen or nature, and as does Harry 
Harootunian more recently when he emphasizes modernity as an "overcoming."" 
    I would like to suggest, however, that the nineteenth century developed a second, non-
dialectical version of modernitys history that, although it replicates many of the dichoto-
mies produced by dialectical model, sought a different way to negotiate between Nature 
and Culture and between East and West. This second model of modernity was evolution-
ary, relying not on dialectical antithesis, but on natural patterns of growth through which 
humanity would come to express itself. History was seen as a natural process, and modern 
liberty was a natural outgrowth of this process. Although this evolutionary form of modernity 
also promised liberty-sometimes even an absolute freedom-its treatment of nature was 
more complex in that nature was not only the opposite of freedom but also the enabler of 
humanitys rise from the mire of nature. Contra Hegel, Nature contained in itself the neces-
sity of freedom as well as being its antithesis. 'Ihis paradoxical position of nature, however, 
was often suppressed, and, in this form of history too, nature was sometimes relegated to the 
dark unconsciousness of humankind's prehistory. 
    Walter Bagehot, who has been described as "the Greatest Victorian,"" is among the 
many practitioners of this evolutionary history. Bagehot's most famous book, Physics and Poli-
tics, was published in 1872 and sought to apply Darwin's principles of evolution to society. 
He begins, as do so many of his European and Japanese contemporaries, with the problem 
of the "Preliminary age" and the difficult leap from the savagery of natural society to political 
society. Once political rule is established, the next problem is the solidification of custom. 
Custom's peculiarity, Bagehot tells us, "is to kill out varieties at birth almost; that is, in early 
childhood, and before they develop."" Indeed, custom becomes a second stultifying nature 
at odds with liberty, and Bagehot is deeply anxious over the difficulty of "breaking the cake 
of custom" (his hallmark phrase) and "reaching something better," namely freedom. 14 For 
Bagehot then, humanity progresses through natural processes such as natural selection out 
of the first savage, society-less form of nature and into the realm of social custom, which 
becomes a second nature, so choked with the rank weeds of expected usage that liberty can-
not begin to grow. Oriental civilization, sadly, is still arrested in this second nature, but some 
European nations-those fragile edifices created to house the diversity of discussion necessary 
to true freedom-have evolved to the third non-natural level. Confident though Bagehot is 
that "Later are the ages of freedom; first are the ages of servitude," 'I his means of moving from 
servitude to freedom involves a delicate operation which is in itself natural-the process of 
evolution-but which also ultimately leaves detrimental forms of nature behind. 
    We see much the same process in the thinking of other historians and philosophers of 
this evolutionary ilk. Modern liberty is seen to be both the natural outgrowth of human his-
tory, and nature's enemy. John Stuart Mill, although he denies that "nature" is a useful ana-
lytical category," replicates evolutionary histories as he traces the move from "those backward 
states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage" to more developed 
societies. As with Bagehot, Mill stresses that custom, like a second nature, can be as detri-
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mental to freedom as the first savage nature experienced by child-like races. As with Bagehot, 
Mill sees how difficult it is to overcome custom. He writes, "Ihe progressive principle ... is 
antagonistic to the sway of Custom, involving at last emancipation from that yoke: and the 
contest between the two constitutes the chief interest of the history of mankind. The greater 
part of the world has, properly speaking, no history, because the despotism of Custom is 
complete. This is the case over the whole East." 17Here again in Mill, we find the same evolu-
tionary sequence: nature, custom as nature, and, finally, liberty. Here again, the Orient is seen 
to be in only the second phase of development. In order to attain modernitys evolutionary 
promise of freedom, not only raw nature, but also naturalized custom must be left behind. 
    Compared with the dialectical mode of achieving modernity, the evolutionary mode is 
more conscious of human origins in nature both as the physical environment and as human 
nature. Evolutionary history is more reliant on natural forces to propel human kind toward 
freedom. Nevertheless, both the dialectical mode of modernity and the evolutionary model 
try to propel human beings beyond nature per se, because only beyond nature-and certainly 
beyond the stage of nature arrived at by Asian countries-can humankind be. truly free.
JapaiA Responses 
    How was Japan to respond to modern history; structured as it was by the repression 
of nature-and all that nature implied: unfreedom, baleful custom, inarticulate childhood, 
amoral impulse, and, most particularly, ` Ihe East? The most impressive fact, of course, is that 
Meiji Japanese leaders chose to respond directly and comprehensively to the challenge of 
modernity and history, insisting that Japan too could be a modern, historical nation, despite 
the fact that the very structure of modern history appeared to suggest that this was impossible 
for an Asian country. On the basic level of institutional development, it should be noted that 
by 1887 Tokyo Imperial University had invited German historian Ludwig Riess to hold the 
first chair of (non-Japanese) history, while, two years later, in 1889, a department of Japanese 
history was also established." On an intellectual level, as we look back at documents from 
Meiji through the 1930s, I think we can uncover at least three basic strategies among Japanese 
responses to modern history, each premised on a recognition of the discipline's structural 
relationship with nature. 
    'The most predictable strategy was to adopt one of the European theories of modern 
history and to replicate it, applying it to Japan. Especially during the Meiji period, most writ-
ers chose the evolutionary model, and advocated the gradual and natural growth of Japanese 
society away from raw nature to freedom. The question of how quickly Japan could evolve 
occasioned fierce disputes, but most writers agreed that progress on these terms was desirable 
and almost inevitable. Fukuzawa Yukichi famously traced the evolution of human society in 
his book, An Outline of the 7heory of Civilization, where human beings, through the natural 
development of their intellectual faculties, gradually go through ascending stages of social 
improvement toward increased liberty and individualism. Even Meiji socialists, as historian 
Matsuzawa Hiroaki has argued, accepted an evolutionary view of history as leading inevitably 
to socialist world governance instead of the dialectical view adopted by later Taish6 leftists. 'I 
    Kata Hiroyuki, tutor to the Meiji emperor and president of Tokyo Imperial University, 
was less certain of the speed at which Japan could hope to evolve, but he too carefully crafted
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an evolutionary history that will gradually produce political rights and happiness for each 
individual, peace and prosperity for each nation, and a world government. His history in 
finken shinsetsu (1882) goes like this: at the earliest stages, the ruthless, reckless struggle for 
survival resulted in superiors lording it over inferiors in harmful ways. Eventually, however, 
social solidarity developed, usually through the work of a greatly superior dictator. This 
despot, having achieved stability in the proto-state, wants necessarily to prevent the arbitrary 
exercise of power on the part of his subordinates, and therefore must grant "certain rights 
and obligations to all the people .1120 Kat6 traces a shifi from a purely self-interested form of 
the struggle for survival to one where intellectual and ethical powers intercede, transforming 
the selfishly competitive situation into one which rewards kindness and public-spirited self-
sacrifice. Kat6 insists that, " as civilization progresses, there are corresponding decreases in 
evil forms of survival of the fittest and increases in just forms, contributing to, in turn, even 
higher levels of civilization .1121 Although allied with the conservative Meiji oligarchs, Katd 
envisions a world of peace and equality when altruistic impulses replace ruthless self-interest 
through natural development. 
    These evolutionary models of history held sway almost to the end of Meiji, when they 
were replaced by a dialectical view of modernity, often focusing on revolution. The debates 
between the left-wing Ran,5ha and the Kazaha in the 1920s amply attest to this more radical 
basis for achieving modernity through antithesis. In the Marxist dialectic as in the evolution-
ary view of history, Japan lagged behind the West, but, with the dialectical approach, the 
problem of the agrarian community became critical because nature was not merely something 
to be grown out of, but something which must be surmounted for a completely different 
set of family and economic relations. Industry was essential, and Marxists argued that the 
agrarian virtues celebrated by the government were not merely a preliminary stage, but the 
antithesis of modernity. In a different way, Maruyama Masao emerges out of this milieu since 
his work too is indebted to a dialectical view of modernity. However, as I have argued else-
      22 where, a certain positivism adopted from theorist Hans Kelsen slips into Maruyarna's work, 
and he at times abandons a dialectical view of history for simple either-or options represented 
by a choice between reason or tradition, culture or nature. 
    In the early twentieth century, not only the left and left-leaning types like Maruyama 
imbibed the idea that modernity meant "overcoming." The far right as well accepted the idea 
that the dialectic was central to an understanding of modernity. The famous 1942 Kyoto 
conference on "Overcoming Modernity" (kindai no chikoku) argued that the dialectic itself 
had to be overcome, which was ironic, as Harry Harootunian has pointed out, since "any at-
tempt to imagine an overcoming of an overcoming could lead to a reaffirmation of the very 
processes of modernity that induced people to think about eventfulness and change."21 
    Let me recap: In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the two ways of achieving mo-
dernity developed in nineteenth-century Europe-the evolutionary schema and the dialecti-
cal schema-were well and truly explored by Japanese writers who often manipulated these 
ideas with verve and facility. However, both the evolutionary and the dialectical approach 
left Japanese thinkers in a quandary. Modernity, due to its very structure, was embodied by 
CC the West" and, whether Japanese liked modernity or not, in adopting these Western under-
standings of modernity, they placed Japan at a disadvantage, as a second order entity left to 
embrace or defy a history defined elsewhere.
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    This dilemma led, I think, to a third strategy for thinking about the relation between 
modernity and nature which also appeared in the 1920s and which was developed through-
out the war years in Japan. This strategy relied, not on mis-recognizing modernity as some-
thing that could be overcome or attained naturally through evolution, but on a profound 
understanding of the flawed structure of modern history, flawed because it had jettisoned 
the problem of nature to the realm of the unthought. This third strategy relied on plumbing 
the depths of the psyche of modernity; it would raise to consciousness the repressed idea of 
nature just as a psychoanalyst might help a patient to interpret the dream signals from the 
non-waking world. 
    Principal among those who wished to resuscitate nature in this way was Watsuji Tetsur6, 
a philosopher and professor who studied briefly in Germany before returning home in 1928 
to begin his most important work concerning concepts of nature, a book called Ffido (some-
times translated as "climate.") The book was published in 1935, with a revised edition issued 
in 1943 to eliminate the "leftist traces" that Watsuji had, he claimed, inadvertently incorpo-
rated in the original treatise. Ffido was a rebuttal to the Heideggerian emphasis on time; it 
shifted the focus to space, insisting that the space which a people occupy is at once social and 
environmental. The world consists, says Watsuji, of three basic climatic regions-monsoon, 
desert, and meadow-which guarantee cultural differences through their minute variations. 
A particular culture, instead of emerging through the dialectic of history, arises through the 
repetition exacted by nature's annual cycles. Instead of the linear or dialectical time of Euro-
pean modernities, time should be viewed as sedimented, the layers of the passing years press-
ing down on one another to form the bedrock of cultural assurance. 
    Elements of Ffido made their way into another important reexamination of nation and 
nature, Kokutai no hongi, sponsored by the wartime Minstry of Education and issued to all 
schools in 1937. It was written by two committees, on one of which Watsuji sat. Like Ffido, 
I think Kokutai no hongi can be read as an attempt to restore nature to consciousness; indeed 
ultimately to claim that Japanese consciousness and nature are the same thing. The Japanese 
love of nature goes beyond mere love of the physical world or customs related to the passing 
of the seasons. Below the surface, the coalescent devotion between the Japanese people and 
nature unites consciousness itself with physical experience to such an extent that one cannot 
be separated from the other. At some mystical level, indeed, the nature of the Japanese islands 
and the nature of the awareness of those who live on them are the same thing, not metaphori-
cally, but literally. Moving from the physical environment through customary practices to 
consciousness itself, nature unifies all aspects of Japanese existence. 
    The commentaries on Kokutai no hongi, written to make this ornate text more compre-
hensible, are rather opaque themselves, but they discuss this issue of the national relation-
ship with nature directly. For instance, in their 1941 commentary, Sonda Hideharu and 
Hara Fusataka insist that the Japanese intimacy with nature is not a personal relationship 
akin to that of Romantic "naturalism" (shizenshugi) in Europe with its stress on individual 
                                24 consciousness (kojin no fikaku). Instead, the connection in Japan lies between nature and 
the communal consciousness of Japanese people as a whole. Indeed, the unbroken "lineage 
of nature" (shizen no goikkei) and the unbroken "lineage of consciousness" (jikaku no goikkei) 
                              21 are united in the imperial line. In other words, what the commentary is saying is that Japan
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will not participate in modernity~s trajectory from nature to history, from unconsciousness 
to consciousness either along the dialectical model or along the evolutionary model. Instead, 
what we see happening here and in other texts of the period, is the assertion that nature is 
consciousness for the Japanese people. 'That which was the antithesis and the suppressed of 
modernity in the West is fully recuperated in Japan. The very structure of the national psyche 
and of national history were transformed, making the Japanese equal to, if not better than, 
other nations. 
    But is this naturalized nationhood still modern? I would argue that it is. Despite the 
emphasis on imperial lineage and appeals to antiquity, this political image of nature as na-
tional consciousness is quite plainly not some residual tradition. It differs markedly from the 
universalism of most conceptions of nature in the Tokugawa and Meiji period by insisting 
that nature itself is somehow uniquely Japan's. While the Japanese scholars and bureaucrats 
who created this image sought to root it in antiquity, they were doing no more than Europe-
ans did in rooting modern democracy in the practices of classical Greece. Invented tradition, 
as we know, is a major trope of modernity. But there are two, even more important ways in 
which this idea of nature as synonymous with Japanese consciousness is modern. First, this 
idea that nature is Japanese consciousness is modern in its concern for identity. If time is 
what Europe claims as the matrix for its development, than space, climate, the environment 
become the preserve of Japanese identity. By psychoanalyzing history and recuperating nature 
for national consciousness, Watsuj i and others claim an identity for Japan which distinguishes 
it from modern nations in its own terms. Second and most importantly, modernity promises 
freedom. In European Enlightenment thought, modernity promised freedom to the individ-
ual who emerged out of the state of nature into the modern state through social contract. In 
Japan, modernity also promises freedom, but in this case, to the nation which emerges intact, 
as a natural entity, into the fiercely contested international arena. Japan is now free, absolutely 
free to do as it wants. I think, in short, that wartime Japan created a form of modern politi-
cal ideology that engaged the problematic of modern history articulated in Europe, and went 
beyond it in realizing that nature did not have to serve as the opposite of consciousness and 
freedom as long as "consciousness" was defined as communal and "freedom" was defined as 
ultranational. 'Ibis is an impressive intellectual achievement even though the political results 
were abhorrent.
Therapeutic Failure 
    'This holism, this desire to integrate humanity and nature, extended beyond history 
and the humanities to the sciences. As the essay in this volume by Pamela Asquith and un-
published research by Gordon McOuat indicate, twentieth-century Japanese scientists such 
as Hayata Bunz6 and Imanishi Kinji also worked out new biological theories uniting all 
life-human and non-human-in ways suspicious of linear development. Working in the 
Japanese colony of Formosa, Hayata posited a new theory of evolutionary biology based on 
complex webs of connection among organisms, webs far more dynamic than the European 
phylogenetic trees that developed only unilinearly. Imanishi went further, insisting on the 
unity of all elements on the planet earth-living and non-living. Writing in 1940, Imanishi 
tells us that "the environment exists in a living thing and the living thing exists in the environ-
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                                      1126 ment, they are not separate. This stance, which seemed so different from Western views, 
was heralded by postwar environmentalists such as Lynn T White who assumed that Japan's 
holistic vision must have consequences for their use of the environment .27 'Through writers 
such as White, the Japanese were transformed from the laggards of modernity to the prophets 
of environmental purity. The bottom line for many was that if, intellectually, conceptually, 
we could bring nature back into history as had the Japanese, we could save ourselves from 
environmental disaster. 
    But the therapy was not really successful. If the goal was true integration, the holism 
achieved remained partial. Nature had been recovered for history only on national grounds, 
and humanity had been reincorporated within the natural sciences only intellectually. As 
                                           21 the work of William Tsutsui demonstrates, even the wartime embrace of nature as national 
consciousness, had precious little impact on the use of natural resources. indeed, looking at 
ideas of nature and the uses of nature simultaneously in modernizing Japan suggests that the 
greatest gulf lies not between the "two cultures" of science and the humanities that C. P. Snow 
and more recently Stephen Jay Gould pointed to, but between ideological values and actual 
practices. We can bring nature back into intellectual history all we want and still create one 
heck of a mess on the land, in the sea, and in the air. Even in Japan, the full recovery of nature 
within history and the complete understanding of humanity~s place within the natural world 
has not yet occurred.
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